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1..  The  propose of this is not to deal with the rationale for  Europe 
.  .  .  .  .  . 
of having an  indep~ndent,  E\lropean~based E.P.IL industry. This  has. been 
.  .  . ( 1)  .. 
done  in the·. Council  of Europe  report ·  ' and  in the  E~E.C.  C"ommission' s 
I. 
Worki~g Pap~~ of  29th  Nove~ber,  1972. 
2.  Itwill concentrate on what Europe can d;o should  do,  analysing. 
cu.rren  t rcal.i  tics innofc.r  aD  they  bear on  this~ and  di!Jcussint; the  ve.riou~~ 
options  open  to  Europoo 
)~  The  word  "option" is deliberately  ~sed because, as will becomPJ clear, 
there is no  ur:iquoly-dctermined stratczy l'Ihich Burope  must  adopt  ..  · 
I 
4.  It is useful to analyse  the  problem of  nizo in ter1:13  of Ii &  D; 
marketine (im:iludinc se;vicing),  ancl  tho ox!Joricnco  curve.  It is tho inter-
action bctl-1oen  these 3  factors that tleternL"lcs  the  minimum  size required for: 
survival and  co:apcti  tivencs::;.  'l'his ninimum:  size is not unique,  but varies 
nccordinc to individual  circwa~tuncon., 
5.  Tho  n &  D threshold is a  concept  thut is frequor:tly usod,  but not 
'Hell  un<lorc tood. 
· 6.  A threshold in a  minii."lum  ~Qlt_!te level of rcsource::i  that in 
requi1·ed  to attain n  certain objective or set of objectives...  B~lou tho 
threshold, it io oft<;n possible  to undertake  tho. activity iri question,  but 
tho  obj~c  tive \!ill not  b;:::  acldevod~  /  . 
7.  In the conputor iwlL:3 try,  t:·w  o bjocti  vo  will be,  for a  nol'l·  firm, 
tho  C.cvolo~)r.:ent  of u  co:;;putcr  or n  ranee  of· cor:rputer:.J.;  1-"'or  e.n  established 
fil"'lJ,  tl:o  obj0ctivorJ  incl~de tlw  c:Jovcloproent  of  n  now  ran[.;c  every 5  to 7  year~, 
the  introcluct5.on of a  continuous  flo'"  of  i:aprove;;1ents,  keeping  nl_)x•cafJt  of 
(1)  The  Computer  Indust.~  __  in  Europe,  hardware  manufacturin~, 
Strasbourg Jan.  1971,  Document  2893. , 
.. 
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technological procre2a in components  ~~d peripherals,  and  the  developnent 
of  ooftw~re nna  applications for users. 
~.  The. R &  D  thre~hold can be cxpres:Jed as an  o.."l11ual  expendi  tUI'ev  or 
as  a  cunulative sum.  Jlaturally,  the  c~ulative sum  divided by  a  ereater 
' 
number  of yearo.  uill produce  m<lthematically a  sooller annual  budGet.  But 
the  c~ulative sum  itself io likely to be  rained if one  tries to  co~presa 
the load-time,  becau3e  ono  then foreeoes  the bcnefito of learnina-by-doing 
of a  sequential approach. 
9.  On  the  other  h~1r:d,  the lend-tine must  not be  alloHod  to stretch so 
long that compotitiYe  cdt;e  is lost or  tho  product is obaoleto ·uhen it reaches 
the  cmrke~. 
10.  The  ft  &  D threshold is not uniquely c.;ivcn"  but depends,  inter al:i,a, · 
on  tho  folloHill0  circUI:lstanccs  : 
uhether the  firm  nccepts  the given state-of-thc-nrt us r'ecards electronic . 
components  and  p.::riphcruls,  or tries to develop nou  devices; 
- t:Zbetlwr  the  firm  buys  out  tho  components  or deviccsp  or develops and 
manufactureo its 01-m; 
tha decree of novelty in tho desicn oyoteo; 
- tho possibility of  buying liccnnos and  technical assi::;tance fron other 
conpn.nies.  ~hus Giemens  and  C.I.I  ..  used  tcchnoloeY from  H.C.A.  nnd  s.D.S. 
re~pectively.  Licenses do  not oblitcrute the need for  in~house R & D 
effort, l:hich in required for effective application and  ndnpte.tion of 
bought-in  t~c."'J.nology,  end  so::.ctimes it may  ..  be  chea~r and  quicker to start 
afresh wi.th  one's mm  desicn.  Z·:uch  also depends  on  the  terns of the 
'·  ··. 
license,  t:hich aro more  favour~  ble  t  the stronger  tho  lic")ncee 'a bargaining 
po~ition and  technolocical strength. 
\, 
the pocnibility of co-operation with m1iversities (r.c.T.  and  lianchestcr 
University);  . ' 
the  ren0o  of applications for which sofhiarc is developed;  I.B.H.  blankets 
Vi1·tually all applice.tiono. - tho dovelopocnt lead-ti.oa (eeo  p.1rc.grnph 8  above); 
- tho previou.n  ezperionce of  the i'im s the greator this ia the loYer 
tho devolopncnt  cQnto; 
.- 'Jhethor f.  &  D b  done in i~uropo· or the  u.s~, boir:i; chcapor in ::.urope. 
11.  Asaun.ins  :  (i)  a  now  entrqnt fin:a 'to the induntry, 
. (ii)  OX.[Y~rioncad pooplo, 
{iii) n  rnnco  fron si!!all  to  ncdi:...~J~lar,~"'  co~puters 
(iv) ata'ldard or ceneral ooftuoro applicntions, 
~"ld  ( v) · n  lc  ud-time of :5  yearn, 
then the totnl •.!ovclopncnt  throohold is  n.b~>Ut t100 million Cil50 - 250 !d.llior. 
or an un.nuol  ezpcndi  turo of (560  million. 
12.  l':e  can  i\u:thcl· ar;nu;w  that R &  D f:.hould  not exceed 10;0 of turnove-r, 
oinca 10,.;  :in  ncrr:;:llly con::titl-::rcd  tho  up pol' lini  t  to  the  tolcrablo burden 
of R &  D costs. 
mu3t  h~vc an mmuul  turn~>ver of tGoo  r~illion if thcro ia no  out!llde 
· support {from  tho  ;;tate or otlE:r divisions  of  tho ccrpoz·;.lto  e:;I'Ou!J)  :for 
H & D. 
14.  lft however,  thr~rc 1:;  govornnent· oupport  to tho  tuna of, any, 
t25 nillion per.  ;1oar  (the :f.irct French nan ;;aJ.cUJ.) •  tho R ·&  D  tr~-cshold only 
require:; n  turnover of 7-350  f:illion. 
15.  ln 1971,  the I;U%'0£)Cll.n-own.c-d  COt.p·mica  h~d the £ollowir15  turnOVt'!I': 
l.~.L.  /370 dllion 
C.l.I. 
llil:dOl'f  $110 
fl 
16.  Thll!:,  nonc. of  thcro  h:::d  renched  the tG:JO  t:iillion  turr.ovo:r.  All of 
~hem, except pcrhnp!:;  lii;:do:t:f,  wero  obtnininf; eovcirnna:J. t  GUJi?Ort  for n &  D. 
17~  'ibro~gh a_policy.of.specialisation,  buying out of components  and. pcripheralo, and  relative conacrvntiom in cladgn,  a  noal.l  fii'D., ::-ey  h.-iva .a 
z:ruch  lo'ltcr n &  D threshold.  lj.'hin  appears  to lmvo  bean  tho  caoo with Duta-
Saab,  Cooputcr Technology Ltd.  11  and Ilixdorf'. 
18.  .  Olivetti,  too,  by :1pccia.liaina in ter::;innls,  office CO!!!putcro,  DIJd 
data-input dovicon,  hu$l  protnbl.Y  m.."\nc.gcd  to achieve a  lo\>er R  t~  D thl'Oohold. 
I 
19.  Even  in tho  zonerul.-purpono  t:arkct,  no  coupnny  cnn hope  to blclllket 
,. 
the market like IDH,  covorinz n1l applications, sizes,  indu~trios and  f!OOcra?hi-
oru.  nreaa.  Po1·  t:.ie roan-on,  I.c.L.  lm~ rec¢ntly a!lllOunced  ita decision· to 
concentrate on  nolectod  upplication3 area3  (manuf~cturi~~' retail,  f~qncc, 
local and  central  t-ova::.~n.'Ilcnts 11  a"1d  public utilitios). 
20.  It vould  ooem  tlwt SicaGno  nnd  C.I.I. are still concentratir>..g  on 
hard·uurc devclopm.;}nt  p:roblcr.l!J,  for thi:l  ::·cm~on,  they nro relatively ntrong 
in roaJ.-tiL1o  work,  but have not yet renchod  tho  utn.{<;G  tihOl'O  .the  choice of 
a.n>l1.co.tiono  arcoa c.rir:scs. 
21.  A number of ctrn.tccic  o~1tion2 clearly  c~~crco for  Europe.  .l?irzt, 
EDP  l'l.:"\rkot  :z·athor  thu..'l  !3pccinlise in oomo  scr;Jo:tt  of thC!  ovo~all rJ.Crkot? 
~ocondly, <l-c:s  ~uro2a i"cant  to  }l.n.ve  an ind:wtry  cnp~iblo of conp-eting ui  thout 
ar..y  e;ovcrnncnt H & D assintanco? 
22.  If tilo  nnGr:er  to both questions is yes,  the implication is t;nam-
bicu.ous.  iione  of tha ;;uropcan-o(mocl  runnu!nctur<.Jrs, is bic cnoU{;h.  !:.'Von  a 
·1:1orear  bohec.."l c.r.I. and  :Sicii!CruJ  i:::  not oufficicnt. 
cro-wi.nz  ooe;mon. .n  of  tl-10  1:1nrket  ouch  no  1 
POS  tJnrkot  (point-o:t'-snlo tcminltla), 
<latn-cntry  oyoto1~, 
or mi."li-cor.:putcr3  (25-305 t:,'TO'I'Jth  p.a.) -5-
24.  It can also be argued that the justification for givinG State· 
asaistanca to  the  ~ndustry ia a  distortion in competition duo  to tho support 
that the u.s.governmont gives, directly or indirectly,  to its indusi~· 
and  thatp  therefore,  so long as this distortion continuo:J  to exist,  J:.'uropean 
induoJtry should be  nosiutod~  If this ia the  case,  depending  on  the level of. 
govornccnt  support,  tho R & D threshold no  longer dictates a  eiven size of 
the firm. 
25.  · There  i.o  another atratet,"ic ·option.  If r:urope  wonts  to  adopt an 
aeressive  (rc.ther than dcfenoive)  R & D policy, i.e. if .h.'urope  wants  to be  a 
teclu'1oloc;ical lender (in some  fields. at least) rather than .a  follov1cr or 
imi  tntor,  tj1e  H &  D threshold is raised by ·a lot,.  perhaps by a.  factor of' 
2 or 3 ut least  .. 
· 26.  The  bono:fi ts of b eine the firnt in a  field in n  CO::l."18rcinll;r... _succes~ 
. ,ful '1-W.l,  uro high  :  high exports,  hieh value-added,  hit;h  prof~  ts,  licensing 
revenues etco  l;'oreien subsidiaries cannot .be  relied upon  for theso  benefit~ 
because R &  D,  und  firot prouuctioh a.ml  collli!.lcl'cialisation,  tend to  take 
place· in the homo  country uhich rep1·esents oore  than  6o;:~ of the total aozets 
of tha fira.  I·:oreover,  profi  to accrue  to the  parent coopany.  The  costs, 
and  riDlro  involved,  of an ngreosive R &  D_  policy ure,  ho'l'leve~,  very· great. 
2:'/.  A po:;aiblo  scenario for .::;urope  is for  the  Buroporu1..:.olmed  firms  to 
opt out of the  ccnernl-purpo~e EDP  r.tnrkct,  a3  l  bnve  said.  'l1uximum  benefit 
could be  derived if each  firm. or croup  ~ere to specialise in different mnrket 
aegmcnts  or to ndopt parallel,  but different,· npproc.ches  to  the  -sru.1e  probleos. 
28..  Th~ro \-rould,  however,  ·:probably  be  no  scope  for parallel nppronchcs 
(and  ,  a  fortiori,  for duplication) if Europe  lrants  to stey in the ceneral 
market  wi  t}~out continuoun  public support. 
A.•,  .  .  ,_ .. 
29.  It seems  thnt a  poolinc of I.O.L., C.I.I.  a.;.d  Siemens  uould allow 
I:.'urope•n  ccuputcr indu::::try  to c1·oss  the R &  D threshold.  A point of pritiordial 
iuport~cc, ho\1evor,  is that a  rncr~Jcr 'loJill  not automatically produce  the -6-
benefits of scale.  ·l'.'bnt  is &bsolutely essential is that there should 
be rationalisation of activities  a.'1.d  resources after the merger.  llut 
rationalisation is ponsible even  out::lide  tho framework  of a  merger. 
~0.  A ;::ajor  ar!d  real difficulty,  \ihich cmmot bo  disniscod,  ia that 
. by now  I.C.L.  is riell advanced in the development of its Hew  Range,  which 
t1ill be  it~ r:min  product lino in the 1970' e and  on  whicM.  all its hopes 
aro  pinned •. If there were  to be  ti mcreer now  between I.C.L.  and C.I.I.-
Siemcnn, it l:ould be utterly unreasonable  to expect I.C.L.  to lirite-off 
it~ development investment of more  than £70  millio~ ·(tl50 N)  and  to disappoint 
its oxiGtins and potential cuotomers.  !-loreover9  the cancellation of 
lieu  lla.nce  'wuld have  dis.:~strous effects on  the company's R &  D personnel 
and  on  ecnernl morale,  perhaps more  destructive than  a  cancellation of 
Concorde or  ~~n 2 • 
.  ;;1.  At firot  sir;ht~ it uould  be ooro roaeonabl-e  to expect C.I.I.  and 
Siemens,  who  'arc utili  di~cu.ssine the details Of their future  COl..llfilOn  ra.."lge 
scheduled for 1977~8, to accept  New  Range  if there was  a.  m~-rger.  T~is is 
to foreet,  hovrcvcr,  th<lt  C.I.I. and  Siemens  are sr.;aller,  individually and 
perhaps  even  combined,  than I.C.L  ••  and  have a  valid reason for  worrying 
about r.c.r,.  predorninn.n~e.  Adherence to Hcl'l  Hnn{;e  l10uld  t;'Teetly  accentuate 
I.C.L.'s  pred~~inance. 
... 
;J2.  norcovcr,  ns  we  ehall discuss later,  the  colll!:lercial strategiesof 
I.C.L.  and  C.I.l.-Siomens  ~y be,  at present,  so different as  to preclude 
common  R & D effort on  the  C.P.U,  of an  ;;l.)p  system.  ..  · 
·' 
iihat about  the prospect of a  merGer  aroWld  1980?  One  possible 
scenerio 1-:hich  l:ould  r:.ake  t.da  possible would  be if either I.C.L.  or C.I.I.-:-
Siemens failed,  so  tb.ut  the other could  proceed with a  airaple  take-over. 
If this does  r-ot  hnp;;en,  pushin;; the dnte  back  to 1930 does  not  improve  the 
proGpcct  of a  merger.  By  1980,  I.C.L.'s new  ranee would  be opproacbine 
t~t?  end of ito useful life, whereas  the  com:;on  range  of C.l.I.-Sietlens,. to 
bt;  launched arotmd 1Q78t  'l'iOuld  bo at the  peak of its care  or. '4·  Tho  impasoo into uhich wo  oro  no'A .. lod  r:lr:..Y  bo  due,  however,  to 
tho uron,.;  q'l.:cstionn  boin:;  nekcd rnthcr then  the non-oxistencc of ony 
acceptable solution.  Granted. thnt ::uropo  J:IU:Jt  h~Ye ll1l  indepoiYlent  cnp.~bili  ty  . 
in  th~ &en~rnl-purposc EDE  oarkat,_ thio  doca  not _neccu3nrily inply thnt 
co-operntion mur.t  centro on  tha C  .P.u.  or l!:ninfraoo.  i'/e  chDll  turn to  , 
this la.tcr. 
,5.  Si.o'lcO  H &.  D ia only a  ng£,eNH!rY.,, but  not~yf_f.!pJ-..Q..IJ!,  condition 
for  r.mcce::m:t.'ul  ln:1ovation  (the other olc:::lcnt3  beinc  p!'Oduc~ion nnd 
.oai'ketin£;),  o.tta.inir  .• g  tho  H &  D threshold coca not gun.rllntec  a  tim either 
aurvivlll or com:JOl'cial  succcoa. 
:;G.  ln n  r..w.:rl::ot  oi  tu.::. tion in \Jhich rival suppli<n·s  cnn off  or sit1ilnr 
prices,  qu:1li ty end delivery dntc:::,  nnd in which,  b(}CI!tt.:::G  of'  technical 
co::tplexi ty it.nd  continuoua  in;-,ovr.tio:~,  custo~ero requ.il'a  on sic  tnr:ce in the · 
servicinc in the dote:rr.JininG f'nctor in m.tccess  or  :r~.ilv..re. 
37.  In n  g!vcn  disti~1ct nnd  hornocen~us narlcet  (a country in Europe), 
n  supplier  :au~t nuintuin n  marketinc nnd  sorvicing or rrm~:b1!1tion to provide 
a  varit;~ty of acr'Vicen  nnd  tcch.'1ical nosictnncc,  evt'm  \~hen he  docn not aim 
Ctt  blanketin  .  .:;  tbo mur-kct. ·  .... 
fc.cto:deu  of in<.lividual large US<.!rs,  tho  couputcr cupplier mMt  ~~ntllin o. 
If ho  attonpts  to  -:t~I<lnl  to  int0111~tional 
\~. 
co;g~;.ar:ics,  h~ rJU!) t  z:-.;nintoin  n  continentr.l or t<!OrlC.-·aide  ap;..!lre.tuc. 
39.  'i'ho  r>.!!turc  of  tho  ~rket cl.!:iod  ct by  the  firm and  th·:l  intonsity of 
compot).tion  tims cetcrdnc a  t.:rc~hold level of  r;~:rketin~-;  e11d  80rvicin[; ·bolou 
\i:hich cffol·ts  to  lX!nctrnte  a  :':l[ll"l:ot  .,re ini3f.foctivc. 
40.  To  be  ecc:rr.o:dcally  ju:.;tifiod,  t)1b  mnrkotinJ thrcchold  (2)  requil'on 
a  :.·~niJaU.':l  ccl.cD  VC·lU:'lQ.  In major \icntcrn  f.'~..l.."''penn  countries  ti..!1d  in tho 
( 2)  __ Y  • S.  HU,  The  Marketing  threshold,  Center  for  Business Research, 
Manchester Business School. 41.  A compnny  thllt opec:ialises in 30I!io  oarkot  o~gment or Dpocialhcd 
product I!:cy,  hovcYer,  lmvo  a  lo\!or  u-:arkf~ting threahold \1hich  rcquiroo a  · 
lo~er ~r/.ct obarc.· 
42.  Tho  minir.n.o  Sil':e  of tho fim eicts.tod by tho uarkoting ti'..J.'eshold 
depondo  on ·the  car·kot otrc..towr of  th~J firm. 
43.·  J\  firn thet ai!llo  nt cmpplying the entire  ~cn.t Em·openn  llUU'kot 
munt  hn.ve  8.'~ of the ii.  ~uropean l1!arket  to nustnin itn ooleo and.  ocrvi~in(; 
offortn. 
44o  T1lO  f~uropoa  ...  "'l-0\tned ril6I!Ufacturcro'  rUlt:.l'C  Of  the  r:Uroperul  onrkot 
are ns  follo~rs: 
c  I.  olJo  ()~ 
~I 
:Jionens  ,,  .  ./ 
'Tl' 
c.r.r.  2;~ 
45.  ~;1orn.enr.1  D.nd  C. I.  I. dcfini  tcly ha  vo  not  re::!ched  the !::u.ropcan 
dimenoion.  even if CO!jb:l.ned.  lt r.1ay  be  thou.r;ht  that r.c.L.  hnr~, but thio 
ia not so yot..  r.c.L.  docs  not hn.vo  a.,~  of tho  tmrket or .1:-orc  in uny country 
exoopt ita hoc:o  country,  tho  U.Ko ·  The  9)~ overc.ll mo.r}:et  Qhtll'O  is duo  to it£: 
46•  To  ope!·atc as  a  \:orld-&iiuo s:..ppliert  tho  required  uiz~ is even 
l.&reor.  Unless  this thrcohold is a ttaine<!,  there ia  no  :!'ope  of reachins  -
~he class of ,.;orld-'1-::i.de  ur,ers  (e.t;.  ttc nirlir.on  r.Ld  tf:c  !)etrolcum companies). 9 
The  experience  curve  and  the  importance  of market  share 
47.  The  experience  curve  refers  to  the  decline  in unit  costs 
with  increases  in  the  cumulative  volume  (  in units)  of  the 
firm  or  industry.  Potentially it encompasses ~  costs.  In the. 
computer  industry,  this  is  a  more  appropriate  todl  of analysis 
than classical  economiew  of  scale,  which  refer  to  the  decrea~e 
in production costs  with  step  jumps  in the  rate  of  output. 
48.  With  the  experience  phenomenon,  and  in a  fast-growing 
industry,  competitive  relationships  ar~ fundamentally  unstable. 
If a  firm  increases  its market  share,  the  greater  increase 
in its cumulative  volume  relative  to its competitors  results 
in lower  costs,  which  can  be  converted  into  further  increases  in 
market  share,  through  price  cuts  or greater  investment  in 
marketing.  Competitive  stability is  only reached  when  one 
producer clearly dominates  the  market.  Conversely,  if a  firm 
falss  behind  competition,  a  vicious circle will  set  in. 
49.  In  the  general-purpose  computer  industry,  unit  coats 
go  down  potentially by  some  15%  every  time  cumulative  volu~6 double 
The  increase  in volume  can  be  achieved  either by  internal  growth, 
or  by  a  merger  provided  the. merger  is  successful.  This  has 
obvious· implications  for  a  European policy,  which  we  shall 
·explore  soon. 
50.  If  IB:-1 8 s  cost  index  is  taken as  100,  and .if we  refer to 
the  effect  of cumulative  volume  on  the  costs  of  the  same  bundle 
of production,  R&D  and  marketing activities,  we  obtain the 
curve  depicted  in Diagram  1. 
51.  Two  important  and  interesting conclusions  emerge.  The 
firstr is  that  the  region where. the  6urve  begins  to flatten  out 
(  ie  where  costs  begin to  decline  less rapidly)  corre~ponds 
to  the  stretch around  10%  of  the  world market.  None  of the  US 
firms  oth~r than  IBM  has  yet  reached  this  point,  but  they 
are  now  in the  S-8%  ~egion.  With  the  mergers  involving  GE  and 
Honeywell,  and  RCA  and  Univac,  and  the  cooperation between 
CDC  and  NCR,  the  resulting three groups  have  virtualli d6ubled 
their market  shares,  made  a  step  jump  towards  the  10%  mark, 
narrowed  their differential with  IBM,  and  increased  their lead 
over  other  companies,  including the  European-o.wned  ones •. 10. 
52.  The  second  conclusion concerns  the  unfavourable position 
of the.European-owned  manufacturers.  The  cost  indices  are& 
IB~I=l 00 
2nd  league  US  companies=17S 
ICL=220 
Siemens=290 
CII=:300 
53.  A  merger  of all three  European-owned  firms,  if the  merger 
is  compl~te and  successful,  would  give  a  cost  index  of about 
200. 
54.  ~~at are  the  implications for  the  ~equired size  of the 
European-owned  industry?  If Europe  wants  to  remain competitive 
with the  second-league  US  firms,  then  none  of the  European-
owned  firms  is  large  enough,  and  even  a  merger  of  ICL,CII  and 
Siemens  would  not  be  sufficient. This  is  a  much higher  scale 
than that  determined  by  the  H&D  or marketing  thresholds. 
55.  Alternatively,  Europe  may decide  to  content  itself 
with  staying in the  th±rd league,  or  to  specialise  in  certa~n 
market  segments. 
56.  The  philosophy  of  the  experience  curve  differs  considerably 
from  the  implications  of  the  R&D  and marketing thresholds.  Any 
cooperation is beneficial,  regardless  of  optimum  levels.  These 
benefits  do  not  end with the  threshold being reached,  but  go 
on  for  ever as  long as  the  experience  phenomenon applies.  There 
is  no  once-and-for-all effort which will enable  the  optimum  to 
be  reached and maintained  si~ply because, .in the  absence  of 
restraints,  IBi-1  could  theoretically wipe  out all competition. 
57.  The  benefits of any measure  of real  cooperation and 
any merger  come  out  from  our  analysis  very  clearly~  No  amount 
of feasible  internal  growth  can permit  the  European-owned 
industry to  lower  its cost as  much  or as  fast. 
58.  These  benefits are  so  considerable  that  even  a  certain 
amount  of inefficiency can  be  absorbed.  Let  us  take  a  numerical 
example.  Firm  A  and  firm  B  both have a  turnover  of  X  and  ~re 
growing at  20%  p.a.  After  a  merger,-C  (=A+B)  grows  at  only  15%· 
p.a.  It will  take  16.3 years  before  the turnover  of A  orB 
overtakes  that  of  c,  assuming  that  the  respective  growth rates 
are  and  can  be  maintained.  It may,  of  course,  be  that  A  or  B 
will have  been  eliminated before  that  time. 11. 
The  problem  of  scal.'e:  summary 
59.  Depending  on  Europe's  ~ompetitive objective,  the  e~perience 
curve  dictates  a  larger ·size  and  a  bigger market  share  than 
the  R&D  or  the  marketing threshold.  Given  the  objective  of 
competin.g  in the  second  league  in  t.he  general-purpose  m~rket, 
we  need  only retain the  notion  of  the  experience  curve,which 
subsumes  the  two  thresholds. 
60.  The  re~uired size  depands  very much  ort  what  are  the 
objectives  for which  the  size  is required.  An  agress~ve or 
defensive  R&D  policy,  the  extent  of specialisation,  the  number 
of markets  to  be  penetrated,  and  the  overall  competitive  aim, 
all these  are  crucial considerations  on which  Europe  has  to 
make  strategic choices. 
61.  ·  Moreover,  the  question whether  the  European-owned 
industry  can  survive  depends  on  what  survival means:  survival 
without  any  support  (  including procurement),  with  the  present 
level  of  support,  or with more  support. 
62.  European-owned  firms  have  survived until  now  with 
1
the 
degree  of  support  that  they have had.  The  only major  reason 
why  they  may  not  be  able  to  do  so  in the future  is radical 
technological  developments  calling for  resources  and  expertise 
which they cannot  muster. 
II:  Technological  developments 
Evolution  or  revolution? 
63.  One  can  conceive  of  a  number  of radical  technological 
developments  in the  next  10  to  15  years:  LSI which reduces  costs 
and/or  ~ncreases speeds  by  a  factor  of 10  to  100,  new  computer 
memory  t~chniques such  a~ bubbles  and  laser,  and  pew  architectural 
designs  such  as  paralled processors  (  the  ILLIAC  IV),  pipeline 
processing,  and  associative  memory.  Will  these  developments  not 
impose  a  big  jump  in scale? 
64.  It  should  be  noted  that,  in the  USA,  many  companies 
outside  the  computer  mainframe  manufacturing  industry are 
_.involved  in,  or  pioneering,  these  deve)Jpment s.  Should  these 
~levelopm~nts take-off commercially,  there  is  no  reason why 
.  ,f.,·. 
~he European-owned  computer  manufacturers  cannot  cooperate with and  buy  from  them.  Cooperation may  also  be  extended to 
the  European electronics,  scientific  instruments,  photographic 
glass,  and  software  industries.  Such  cooper.ation  should  reduce 
considerably the  burdens  of meeting  the  technological 
challenge. 
65.  It  seems  likely,  however,  that  future  technological· 
developments will  be  evolutionary rather  than revolutionary, 
_with  emphasis  shifting from  hardware  features  to total 
systems  efficiency. 
66.  The  present  co-existence  of Jrd  and  4th generation 
machines  indicates  that  the  revolutionary displacement  of 
the  1st  by  the  2nd  and  of  the  2nd  by  the  3rd generations 
is  not  likely to  be  repeated. 
67.  There  is a  strong feeling  that  even current  technology 
is ahead  of users' ability to  use  it fully.  According tp  Dr 
H.  Grosch  of the  US  Bureati  of Standards,  few  installations 
in the  ~S operate at better than  10~ of ieasonable  effectiveness. 
Users will  be  less  inclined to  rush out  to  buy  new  machines 
:simply because  of the  incorporation of  new  technical features. 
They will  be  concerned  mainly · with the  effectiveness  and 
cost  of  the  system as  a  whole. 
The  declining  importance  of  the  CPU 
68.  Not  only are  users  less  interested  in the  technical 
features  of the  CPU,  but,  because  of technical  progress  leading 
to  cost  reductions,  the  importance  of  the  CPU  is declining 
in relation to  the  value  of  systems  and  of  industry-wide 
deliveries~ Reliable  figures  are  impossible  to  obtain,  b~t 
it seems  likely that,  in a  few  years  time,  the  value  of CPUs 
will  be  overtaken by  two  faster-growing sectors,individually: 
(1)  peripherals,  terminals,  i'nput-putput  devices,  and  {2) 
systems  design and  layout  work. 
69.  It also  happens  that  it is much  easier for different 
firms  to  cooperate  in these  two  fields  than  in the  architecture 
of the  bPUs.  The  im~ort~nt implication of this  fa~t for 
European  cooperation will  be  explored  in the  next  section. 
10.  Morevoer,  Europe  is weakest  in the  fields  of  components 
and  peripherals,  and  of  large  systems.  All  the  European-:-owned 
firms  rely,  to  some  extent,  on  Texas  Instruments  or  Motorola 
for  their elctronic  components,  on  CDC  and  Memorex  for  their mem6ry  control  devices,  etc.  There  is  no  European-owned  mariu-
facturer  of LSI.  There  is in Europe  riot  a  single airline 
reservation system that  was  delivered  by  a  European-owned  firm 
or group.  Both  the  French and  the  British railways  rely on 
US  suppliers for  their  traffic~control real-time  systems. 
III.  European  cooperation, 
·and  the  problem  of  IB:v1-compatibilitr 
Statement  of  the  problem 
71.  The  reason why  ICL has  not  been  able  to  come  together 
with  CII  or  Siemens  is said to  center  on  the  ques~ion of 
compatibility with  IBM.  After  the  breakdown  of .its talks with 
CII,  ICL  sa_id  that  "differences  in philosophy"  prevented. 
agreement.  !v1ore  recently,  Siemens  said that  ICL was  wcl.come 
to  join the  continental  group  provided it was  willing to 
adhere  to  the  group's  "Treaty  of Rome".  The  "Treaty of  Rome" 
.is  I~l compatibility. 
How  real  is the  problem? 
\ 
72.  At  a  technical  level,  incompat~bility is  no  barrier to 
cooperation.  The  computers  of  GE  and  Honeywell  were  not 
compatible,  but  Honeywell  has  successfuly taken  over GE's 
EDP  operations.  After Univac's  take-over  of  RCA's  EDP  division,  ..... 
RCA  users  were  able  to  convert  to  the  Univac  9700  Series 
through  a  convers_ion  package, _§MOOTH,  and  it is noteworthy 
that.90% of  RCA  users-remained with Univac •.  ICL's  New  Range 
will  be  able  to  bridge  programs  from  the  1900  and  System 4 
machines. 
73.  Tpe  Burroughs. B1700  computer  is  a  pointer  of  the 
shape  of  things  to  come.  It  is  a  soft  or Protean  ~achine, 
i.e.  it does  not  have  a  fixed,  built-in machine  code  and 
operating system.  Through  the  use  of microprogramming,  it 
can  emulate  any high-level  language. Theoretically~ lt can 
work  on  any  program  from  any maker's  computer. 14. 
7  The  question of compat.ibility arises at  three  levels.  4. 
(1)  The  most  difficult to achieve  is compatibility at 
the  level  of machine  codes  and  operating  systems,  which  requires 
identity of machine  architecture.  But  the  advent  of  the  ~oft 
machine  concept  is making  th~s preoccupation obsolete. 
75.  (2)  At  the  level  of  applicati~ns programs,  compatibility 
can  be  achieved  through  the  use  of  compilers,. which are · 
software  programs  doing  translation work.  Alte~natively, 
a  program  can be  converted  once-and-for-all  into  a  different 
language,  to  suit  a  different  computer,  by  the  use  of 
conversion  programs. 
76.  (3)  The  level at ·which greatest possibil -- ies  exist 
for  compatibility  is that  of  the  plug-to-plug  iu~erfaces 
between  CPUs,  add-on memories,  peripherals,  and  data  transmi-
ssions.  IBM  is experiencing great difficulties,  for  example, 
in preventing users  of its computers  from  adding  on  non-IBH 
devices. 
77.  On  the  whole,  therefor~, compatibility is  a  non-probie~o 
Either it does  not  matter,  or it is perfectly  fea~ibl• 
and,  what  is more,  economic,  because  of  the  decreasing cpst 
of hardware o 
The  real  problem 
ya.  We  must  therefore  ask why  is it that  the  European-owned 
manufacturers  cannot  come  together,  if compatibility turns  out 
to  be  a  non-problem. 
79.  One  possible  explanation,  which  does  no  credit  to  Euro~e, 
.is that  CII,  Siemens,  and Philips  are  several  years  behind  the 
current  state  of  the art, and·are still obsessed  ~ith the 
"la~t war". 
eo.  It  seems,  however,  that  the  squabble  about  compatibility 
may  reflect  a  fundamental  differenc•  in the  approach  to  the 
market o ·what  are  the  main growth prospects  of CIL and  Siemens?-
.Their respective  public  sector markets,  which  are  more  than 
60%  in the hands  of  IBM  at  present.  Compatibility with  IBl-1 
minimises  the  costs  of  co!1verting  from  Iffil  to  CII-Siemens, 
and  the  posture  of  compatibility  rea~sures the  prospective 
customers. 'who  rely on  IB~t at present. 
81.  As  for  ICL,  it alreadr has  a  high  share  of  the-UK 15. 
government  market.  Iml-compatibility will  not  help it to 
increase  market  penetration,  while  exposing  it to direct 
competition from  IBM  and  depriving it of  its technological 
initiative. 
82.  This difference  in market  position is  the  real 
stumbling block  in the  way  of  European  cooperation. ~ 
primary  aim  of  European  policy must  be  to  create  the  conditions 
for  a  common  conmercial  strategy,  ~hich is  the  only  basis · 
on which  the  European-owned  firms  will willingly cooperate. 
No  amount  of  talking or  pressurising can take  the  place  of 
this  fundamental  requirement. 
83.  In.the  light  of  this  crucial point,  we  consider the 
alternative policy measures  open .to  the  Commission  and  European 
national  governments. 
IV.  The  policy measures  available  to  Europe 
Subsidy versus  procurement 
84.  According  to  neo-classical  economic  theory,  a  subsidy 
intervenes  on  the  supply side,  whereas  a  tariff acts  on  both the 
supply  and  demand  sides.  A  subsidy  is  there~ore preferrable, 
because  it introduces  only  one  11distortion11  instead of  two. 
85.  This  simpliste view· is quite  irrelevant here.  The  theory 
of  international  trade  leaves  out  econ6mies  of  scale  and.~arket 
imperfections,  and hence  the  need  to assist  infant~industries. 
86.  Moreover,  the  dichotomy  between tariff and  subsidy 
is  not  clear at all  in the  case  of aid  to  R&D  and  prefe~~nc~ 
in public  procurement.  Although  general  grants  and  loans  to 
support  the  H&D  budgets  of  companies  is distinct  from  the 
purchase:~f standard,  repeat-order  products,  there is little 
distinction in practice  between development  contracts  and 
the  procurement  of one-off,  custom-made,  or  large and  compl_ex 
systems,  both of which  involve  some  technical  novelty and  deve-
lppment  work. 16. 
General  aid  to  R&D 
87.  Theoretically,  this offers  the  advantages  of introd\.rc'ing 
the  minimum  amount  of  "distorti.on"  and  of penalising the  users 
least. This  instrument,  however,  acts  only  on  a  part,  and  a 
·small part,  of  the  total  effort  required for  successful 
innovation and  competition,  which  includes  R&D;  production, 
marketing,  servicing,  leasing;  etc. 
88.  The  main  objection to  exclusive  reliance  on  this 
policy measure  is that it does  not  satisfy our  fundamental 
requirement,  namely,  that  of creating conditions  favourable· 
to the  emergence :o·f· a  common  commercial  strategy between  the 
European-owned  firms. 
89.  At  present,  R&D  funding  is purely national.  Even  if there 
is a  pooling  of  the  national  funds,  there would  still remain 
the  well-known  and  intractable  prob~em of how  to allocate 
the  funds  between  the  different  national  comp~nies, diverting 
time  and  energy  away  from  more  important  issues. 
go.  Neverth:eless,  the  companies  are  unlikely  to  survive 
. if government  H&D  funds  were  suddenly .cut  off,  arid  I  recommend 
that this  form  of  support  be  retained.  What  follows  is 
additional  to  this  support. 
Development  contracts  and  publi; procurement 
91.  These  are  the  main  instruments  by which  conditions  for 
the  emergence  of  a  common  commercial  strategy between  the 
European-6wned  firms  can  be  createdo  There  is  t~e  ~dditionai 
~dvantage that  the  actual,  detailed  forms  of  cooperatio~ can 
be  left to  the  companies  themselves  to decide,  thus  avoiding 
~ny error  of  judgement  of  those  who  are  not  directly concerned. 
92.  ~e public  sector markets  of  the  EEC  countries  {  inclu-, 
ding central and  local governments,  universities  and  nationalised 
industria~) amount  to.~ome 10%  of the  world  market,·~he famous 
threshold.  This  is sufficiently  larg~ to  sustain,  without 
any  private  sector markets,  a  viable  computer  industry.  If 
the  indu~try derives.half of its sales from  pr~vate markets~ 
it needs  only half of  the  public  sector market  to  reach the 
thre  sho.ld. 17. 
93.  The  ideal  solution is a  combination of  tw6  approaches. 
(~)  Open  up all public  sector markets  to all  Eur6pean-own~d 
firms,  without  any discrimination by  national authorities in 
favour  of nationally-owned dirms  :  this will  create  a  common 
market  for  the  European-owned  firms,  and  hence  the  precondition 
for  cooperation between  them,  ie  common  commercial  interests. 
( 2)  Use  Community  Development  Contracts  for their demonst:-at ion · 
effects,  to hasten the  sp~ed of  cooperation and  mergers • 
.  94o  Nevertheless,  the  opening  up  of public  market~ presents 
the  most  serious  administrative  and  bureaucratic difficulties. 
There are  already great difficulties in  implementing  and. 
coordinating purchasing at  the  national  level.  These  dif.ficulties 
will  be  multiplied  exponentially if the  policy is applied at 
the  European  level,  with traditional,  nationalistic  sentiments 
inevitably  coming  into  play at  the level of  individual users, 
if not  at  the  central  government  level. 
Form  of preference 
95.  If only  to  overcome  these  reluctances,  it is essential 
that  the  users  must  not  be  made  to  bear  the  cost  of a  preferen~ 
tial procurement  policy.  Moreover,  these  costs  may  be  considera-
ble,  not  just  in terms  of expenditure,  but  in terms  of  reduced 
efficiency of the  users,  given the  strategic role  of the 
computer  in management,  research,  production control,  etc. 
96.  A  price preference  is also difficult,  if not  impossible, 
to apply,  because,  with all the  technical  complexities  of  an 
EDP  system,  the  11product 11  is difficult  to define  clearly,  and 
price/performance has  no  clear meaning.  Price has  many 
dimensions:  credit  terms,  rental  conditions,  conditions  of 
maintenance  and  technical  support,  software  avai~ability, 
cost  of add-on  units,  running  costs,  etc.  Performance  may 
differ  e.n.ormously  according to  the  nature  of problems  to which 
the  computer  is applied and  adcording  to  the  training of  the 
assessors. 
l7.  the  simplest  solution,  \o~hich  is also  that  most  acceptable 
to users,  is to  offer theuhinducements  to  buy  European,  in .the 18. 
from  of  credit facilities,  stibsidies,  and  coverage  of  th~ costs 
of conversion. 
98.  Given the  large  number  of use'rs  at present  using  IB!>i 
who  could  convert  eventually to  European  sources,  there  is 
considerable  scope  for  cost  savings  in the  conversion process 
if a  certain amount  of standardisation can be  imposed  on 
the  user departments,  and  if the  European-owned  companies, 
inc+uding the  software firms,  can share  their experience. 
Time 
99.  Given  the  fact  that  US  companies  have  in general  already 
developed  advanced applications  for  the  US  government,  they  can 
meet  an  order  in Europe  for  advanced  systems  more  rapidly than 
their European  competitors.  It would  be  useful  for  the  latter 
if  they were  given m6re  time  to  develop the  systems  to  meet 
these  orders:  One  way  of doing  thi~ would  be  to  set  up  a  planning 
bureau at  the  European  level;  which would  inform the  European 
-
companies  of  forthcoming  needs.  Another  would  be  to  extend  longer 
deliverty dates,  with the  user retaining existing equipment 
until the  European-o,~ned firm  or  group  can deliver a  satisfactory 
system which has  been debugged • 
.  . 
V.  Conclusions 
..  -~ 
I.  With  the  world  restructuration of  the  computer  industry, 
and  the  lead acquired  by  three  US  groups,  as  a  result  of merger 
or cooperation,  over  the  remaining  companies,  Europe  must  act 
·fast. 
I.I.  The minimum  size  required depends  on  what  the  size  is 
required  for.  Europe  must  make  choices  as  to  an agressive  or 
defensive  R&D  policy,  the  extent  o;  specialisation,  the  number 
of markets  to  be  penetrated,  and whether  to  fight  for  a  ~lace 
in the  2nd  or 3rd  league  of  competitors. III.  Compatibility  ~s no  barrier to  co~peration,at the  technicai 
level. 
IV.  The  real  problem  is  to create  the  conditions ·for  a  common 
commercial  strategy ·between  ~he European-owned  firms. 
I  . 
V.  Cooperation  should start where  it is easiest  and  most 
important,  in  components,  peri~herals, and  advanced  sy~te~s 
work,  before moving  on  the  CPU,  which matters  less  and  less.· 
VI.  Primary  emphasis  should  be  on  the  opening  up  of public, 
markets ,in Europe  together with  Community  Development  Contracts.· 
VI!.  Instead of a  price preference,  users  should  be  offered 
assistance  j_n  converting to  European  suppliers. 
VIII.  There  is ·considerable  scope  for  cost  savings 
in the  conversion process,  given standardisation on  the  ta~ers 
side~  and  cooperation on  the  suppliers  sideo c;o: 
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